Scenarios: Unrest: Home invasion Pt13: Physical protection: Doors

Doors:

Tips

General advice

  • Ideally for a fairly secure normal door you want:
    • single-leaf (for rigidity),
    • outward-opening (against ramming),
    • fabricated steel or least solid timber,
    • surface-mounted multipoint locks,
    • autodeadlocking but unlocking by key only,
    • with long throw and tiny gap between frame and leaf,
    • deep and wide jambs,
    • dog bolts,
    • security butt hinges,
    • extra long hinge screws and
    • no glazing if you want to delay many minutes (failing which, high security windows with similar protection and laminated glass or polycarbonate glazing).
  • You cannot just laminate plywood to steel as if you were boarding up windows and mortice locks into the edges, as they will just burst under attack, instead you need a steel frame to hold a core such as plywood which can then be skinned with steel, unless you rim mount the locks and dog bolts, but even then the edges are vulnerable to being chewed up by crowbars. To see why, just watch videos of residential security doors with multiple bolts being prised out of the keep. If it was not for the weight and poor insulation, what you would do is fill the frame and leaf core with reinforced concrete, including steel mesh, during construction.
  • If building your own door then if aiming at SR3, as explained below, you want to grout the frame against jacks and wedges, use high hardness steel door skins or inserts against wedges, hammers, shears, drills and saws, and use multipoint rim locks against crowbars. To reach SR4 for a door in reinforced masonry you would need thicker skins and harder inserts and maybe an internal panel to chew up drill bits and saw blades like Avertic Armour, or just use 10mm steel plate. It would be a brutal slab, a bit like Assa Abloy’s armoury door.
  • Solid wood doors can withstand a short attack on the wood; the problem comes with attachments like locks, hinges and glazing.
  • Master Locksmith Association publish Guidelines for minimum security requirements for domestic property. The latest version as at Sep 2020 was 12 on 01/01/18. This only advises how to deter casual attacks with existing doors and windows weaker than walls.
  • RISCAuthority publish a set of residential minimum security standards in their ‘Physical security for homes: guidance for occupiers’.
  • There is a CPNI guide to door security.
  • For more information on state level security consult the admittedly dated JSP440.
‘Security door’

Location

  • Minimise the number of exterior doors. Ideally only have one, in fact ideally have no external keyways and always have someone indoors to let you in. Failing that, have only one door unlockable from outside, with any others having a flush face.
  • Sometimes building regs, fire safety, disability, occupiers liability, mean you can only achieve security by using a lobby of two slightly too weak doors.
  • Avoid homes with set back doors that can hide burglars in a porch, unless you are sure it is necessary to prevent levering or vehicle ramming.

Fixings

  • Fixings should be M10 bolts (ideally epoxyed eg Hilti) if you want openings to have any chance of being as secure as the wall. Avoid the usual nylon rawlplugs contractors may try to use.
  • Avoid split spindle multipoints like the plague, as they encourage occupants to not deadlock the door.

Materials

  • Unrated security doors typically last 1 to 4 minutes against heavy hand tools or battery tools, depending whether made of 1.5mm or 2mm steel plate and whether hinges and gaps are protected. To slow down power tools you may have to use a vault door or a series of security doors. Ultimately a pneumatic drill and thermal lance will come through even a vault door. Doors may have to be upgraded to resist modern cheap 36V battery tools, with materials such as manganese steel and ceramic (for hardness) and fibres (such as kevlar, to clog up blades); this is the focus of a CPNI project, FARM.
  • Steel doors should be galvanised and at least 14 gauge. To avoid welds eventually showing through paint, specify a wood skin.
  • Something to beware of, even for steel outward opening security doors, is that an organised gang might use commercial hydraulics to come up with their own version of the likes of Libervit Blackline gear, such as their top of the range battery powered 7t-rated VE70 & Option T (sold as DoorRaider to the tactical community), which can rip out an RC3 security door with aluminium skin or 0.75 steel skin with morticed locking along the locking stile, but maybe not an LPS1175 door with rim bolts and which will usually have at least a 1mm steel skin. For exceptional risks you should ensure a hard smooth floor surface outside the door that will not grip metal studs. See the post on MoE kit.
  • Hollow steel doors typically contain steel spacers, Celotex or LDPE (low density polyethylene, basically a chopping board) insulation and sometimes extra steel and sometimes even gluing on Avertic Armour (anti cut forestry protection resold by Burton Safes) for reinforcement. Extra steel and maybe also Avertic sheet is needed against drills for solenoid locks to protect cables, and for panic bars as even two tiny holes allows a fishing attack. Avertic weighs only 2-2.5kg/m2 and is available at level 1 against drills & chainsaws, level 2 against grinders, level 3 against power saws and level 4 against recips.
  • Anti drill steel such as D2 is hard and thus brittle so needs to be protected by softer door skins, eg S275 mild steel or pregalvanised mild steel which is even softer. Even 4mm K700 manganese steel can have a 10mm hole put through it by a 12V drill in 95s whilst a 10.8V L-ion drill takes 138s, in fact it is about the same as stainless steel.
  • Thickness is everything with door skins, as, for example, doubling galvanised steel from 1 to 2mm makes it ten times stronger against deflection.
  • Even SR4 doors are in trouble once about 4t is pressing on the lock, so multipoints become necessary.
  • Home Office tests found that mortice lock security doors can be breached by two men with manual tools in six minutes if wood and twelve minutes if hollow steel, and steel doors are more vulnerable to battering rams but less so to hydraulics if multipoint as they tend to bend leaving other bolts engaged. Wood doors are sometimes better against spreaders as the frame splits leaving the hydraulics with no fulcrum. Disc cutters are the most devastating against all doors, in fact they are the only cutting tool that works well against steel hollow doors. Thermic lances work but make horrendous smoke when they reach insulation.
  • You do not have eggbox doors anywhere at home, right?
And thin wood is not much better either…
Nor is aluminium…
Avoid cheap Chinese ‘security doors’
  • With power tools a crawl size hole can be cut in a steel skinned door in 3 minutes and three hinges can be cut in 1 minute with hand tools, or with power tools if hinge pins are welded.
  • Fill metal frames with concrete.
  • Fill hollow metal doors with redwood to slow down cutting.
  • Extrusions, upvc and glazing are best avoided.
  • UPVC panels can be upgraded to slightly more robust ‘security’ versions, but in reality they are sometimes just 4mm MDF hidden between sheets of polystyrene, whereas police advice on womens refuges is to to reinforce door panels with 12mm plywood.
  • Having no glazing in an external door may mean a dark hall, but you could replace an internal door with a glazed version to make up for it or fit a sun tunnel through the loft into the landing in a house.
  • External doors should average 1.8W/M2.k insulation, which is why many security doors are filled with foam.
  • Have pre-cut boards on standby to barricade all ground floor openings.
  • As a stopgap insurers advise businesses to cover doors with 1.5mm steel sheet at 150mm centres with 6mm dome head coach bolts filed down or welded tight inside. This could work for a SHTF scenario where looks no longer matter. JSP440 recommends an 18 gauge steel facing screwed into the edges every 4″. Avoid the locksmith scams where they sell a 1.5mm sheet for £400 that doesn’t even reach the edges.

Threats

Manual attack

Standards

Housebuilder standards

  • In addition to the standards covered below, there is BS8220-1:2000 for domestic security and BS8220-2:1995 for commercial. As a guide, BS8220-1 only asks for one BS3621 lock and any cylinders to BS EN1303:2005 grade 5 key security and grade 2 attack security.
  • Aside from security standards for doors and windows, UPVC products should be to BS7412 and BS12608. Aluminium profiles should be 1.2mm thick and to BS EN12020 and BS4873 using temper T5 or T6 and alloys 6060 or 6063. Steel profiles should be to BS6510.
  • To cut a long story short, the standards PAS, SBD, low grade STS and EN1627 RC1-4 are hopeless for WROL scenarios with mobs, weapons and no police, whereas RC5-6, DOS SD-STD-01.01 for (brute force mob attacks) or LPS 1175 ratings can potentially see off a noisy tooled up gang attack, including trying to bust through glazing (there is also the USA’s HPW TP-0500.03 ‘Prolonged’ for 3 hour glazing resistance). The gold standard though is to be found in the counter terror ratings from CPNI, although for example that can be met against forced entry by 12mm polycarbonate glass laminate such as Tecdur. Mob attacks can also be mitigated by the USA’s ASTM F3038, which specifies protection for 15 or 60 minutes against multiple attackers, eg AssaAbloy Forced Entry doors (also rated to STD-01.01) 1.75” thick, and is basically the commercial non-ballistic equivalent of government SD-STD-01.01 standard.
  • Buildings regulations treat PAS24, STS 201, STS 202 level 2, LPS 1175 SR2 and LPS 2081 SRB as equivalent. These are all stealth attack standards with small quiet tools without breaking glass, except LPS 1175 SR2 – which gives three minutes against bigger noisy tools (like hammer, hand drill, screwdriver and hacksaw) and allows breaking glass.

Insurance standards

  • LPS1175 approved installers have to be certified to LPS1271 which requires them to register your door or shutter with LPCB. Of the manufacturers of LPS1175 security doors that might suit a home only Ascot and Sunray have LPS 1271.
  • Look for LPS 1175 or EN1627 rated doors to match your wall strength, usually SR2, SR3 RC5 or RC6. Occasionally they will also have PAS, STS or SBD, which they should far exceed, but are not normally aimed at the housebuilder market so it is common for manufacturers not to bother with those entry level certificates.
  • The accompanying standard to EN1627 for security glazing is EN356, rated from P1A to P8B. Glazing up to P5A weighs 16-22kg/m2 and is safety glass to stop a steel balls coming through accidentally and only needs glass a maximum of 10.3mm thick so is not even anti bandit glass. P6B to P8B needs laminated glass 15-26mm thick weighing 23-30kg/m2 or polycarbonate laminated glass 10-18mm thick. This glazing standard EN356 is even worse than the barrier standard EN1627. You probably want to go for LPS1270 security glazing which is rated to match LPS1175 SR levels and measures how many minutes it will stop a finger hole, hand hole and body hole.
  • You may as well know how big and ugly an SR3 door is, so here are the tests:
Teckentrup censored the couponing with hammer and chisel
SR2-3
SR3
SR3
SR3
  • If you worry your walls are too weak or your pocket too shallow for an SR3 door here is what an SR2 door looks like:
LPS security door market
  • Security doors as strong as brick, rated SR3, will set you back £2,500-£8,000 and any SR rated doors tend to look like prison doors (unless upgraded with decorative skins), outward opening with no glazing (unless you can accept a cell-style vision panel), made from 1.5mm steel. They are only as strong as the brickwork holding them, which can be gouged to release straps and screws, eg by percussion chisel or a concrete saw three inches around the frame to miss the fixing bolts. The highest rated available door used to be SR4 (as government did not buy higher rated doors as extra security is provided by alarms and guards), but now, for example, AccentHansen and Sunray do an SR6 door (the latter Excludor 6 is basically a cell door, still only uses 1.5mm steel skin, the leaf is only 45mm thick and it weighs ‘only’ 135kg), although even if anyone started making an SR8 door it would only be certified for 20 minutes attack time and would only be as strong as the M20 bolts holding it to the reinforced concrete. Nobody makes LPS 1175 residential doors as such, so you may have to buy to a different standard and beef it up with a grille, or accept an industrial look, or pay to upgrade to a decorative skin. Even an SR6 door can be gapped by steel wedges and a sledgehammer: the goal is to use locks strong enough to hold it to the frame nonetheless and skins that cannot be cut through fast enough to let someone in within a few minutes. During attack, the door and handles will shake, covers will fall off the lock, the bolt will start pulling out of the keep in both planes and the case will twist, hence it needs to be long throw. Incredibly the high security locks fitted to top end security doors usually only have a throw of 0.75-1.5″, but tests on steel doors have shown top and bottom bolts can hold until the middle spreads 10″.
Sunray Excludor 6
Police
Housebuilding / SBD
  • Police recommend and building regs specify a minimum of:
    • wooden door weight of 600kg/m3,
    • 44mm thick,
    • solid or laminated,
    • frame rebating leaving 32mm of thickness,
    • panels 15mm thick and glued and mechanically fixed, and
    • panel smallest dimension 23cm.
  • SBD only requires doors to be A3 rated – only protecting for 3 minutes and only against quiet light small pocket tools. With no fewer than 342 SBD door suppliers at the last count, you probably need to look for additional and higher ratings to narrow your search. Police rarely expect anyone to go for a door rated over SR2 and advise the addition of a grille could be OK instead of an SR3+ door, although that is a bit dodgy in the event of a fire and liable to not be used due to inconvenience.
  • Police advice on refuges and gun storage gives hints on how to make your own security doors.
Refuges
  • Police advice on domestic violence sanctuary rooms is:
    • frames fixed to wall on 400mm centres with 5 gauge 80mm screws into wood stud or 8 gauge 120mm frame fixers into masonry,
    • door to be outward opening 44mm solid fire door with BS8621 hook multipoint with 3 star cylinder plus 2 star handles, anti thrust plate, three EN1935 grade 11 102x76mm hinges, two hinge bolts and a TS002 door viewer, plus fire and smoke seals and threshold and 25x33mm fire door stop.
Gun rooms
  • Police advice on gun storage doors is at least two Hela Tech 26/5 or BS3621 equivalent locks and:
    • gun enclosure doors can be 44mm solid timber with three hinges (no hinge bolts needed unless outward opening) and reinforced keeps;
    • gun room doors should, depending on risk, be:
      • 44mm solid timber, or timber faced with 16 gauge steel wrapped round the edges and screwed externally with security screws on 125mm centres, with frame screwed 150mm deep into wall at 400mm centres
      • SR4 door, eg Security Direct UK charge £4,200 for an SR4,
      • 10mm steel plate, eg Independent Safes charge around £2,000 for a gun room door in 10mm (or 8mm with 6mm reinforcement):
        • with three steel hinges continuously welded to door and frame and 20x40mm section 20mm deep hinge bolts only if hinges external,
        • door overlapping frame 20mm if outward opening,
        • keeps continuously welded to frame if inward opening,
        • locks in 60x10mm steel carriers continuously welded to door,
        • frame of 10mm steel 200x75mm T section rag bolted on 400mm centres either side of T section with external bolts splayed or welded,
        • if armoury door then bolts should throw 20mm, three instead of two locks needed and if lock drives boltwork then one bolt needed along top, and
        • if steel armoury then door should be reinforced with 6mm steel 50x50mm angles welded close to edges and hinges welded to it plus 6mm steel angle bolt shrouds welded to the frame plus timber walls floor and ceiling of flooring strength with 75mm gap between steel and boards.
CPNI
Counter tactical
  • If you expect to be targeted by state actors or equivalent you need to consider stronger doors that can hold off tactical gear like the:
    • Tac Focus which is a L shaped frame allowing a second operator to focus an enforcer on a bolt,
    • Holmatro hydraulics such as:
      • Cutters:
        • HWC32A cable cutter rated to 25t which can chomp through 25mm steel bars,
        • 20t rated SMC5006, or GCU5060 EVO3 182t rated rescue cutter.
      • Spreaders:
        • HWJ 25U wedge or PW5624ST Powerwedge rated to 24t which needs only 6mm insertion space,
        • GSP5280 Evo3 47t rated spreader,
        • Telescopic Ram TR 5370 LP rated to 23t which could spread openings if a few inches deep to get it in,
        • GDR200EVO3 7t rated door ram,
        • HDO 100-2 10t rated inwards opening door opener,
        • HDR 50ST 5t rated door spreader & pusher or DR200 7t rated door ram for multipoints,
        • HDB90ST Door Blaster 5t spreader / 4t pusher with 2m hose or 100m radio remote control.
        • Generally the most dangerous spreaders cannot work unless there is already a gap of at least 6mm and often need to come in at an angle rather than up against a door, so it is vital to resist wedge attacks, although even battery powered door openers that fit in tiny gaps can push 7t, and spreaders can be smashed into gaps on wooden doors, so welded multipoints and steel doors are advisable.
      • Combis
GDR200 Evo 7t spreader
10t spreader
  • Avoid gaps anywhere of 3cm as that lets in a lifting bag which can be rated up to 96t.
  • Jacks are available rated to push up to 100t or pull 25t.
  • Consider that no UK or EU civilian standard covers mobs as they are only rated for bodily force by a lone attacker, which is a reason to go for the strongest you can afford. CPNI PBAS and US DOS SD-STD-01.01 cover multiple attackers.
LPS
  • LPS1175 standard is for security barriers, but does not address thermal shock, chemical, blast, ballistic attack or static load. To resist static load LCPB recommend multipoint locking.
  • LPS1175 Ratings SR1-2 are for domestic and low commercial risk, SR3-4 for commercial risk, SR5-6 for high risk and SR7-8 for extremely high risk. For comparison, SR1-2 (or PAS or RC2-4) is normally recommended for secure hospitals, SR1 inside and SR2 outside, with SR3 reserved for the most dangerous inmates in high security hospitals equivalent to cat B prisons, and the highest rating ever needed in that setting being C20 to cover noisy tools wielded for over 20 minutes, although ratings up to RC5 or SR5 may be specified for static load resistance and robustness to take years of abuse.
  • SR1-2/3 is for amateur burglars, SR3/4 upwards for professionals, and SR5/6-8 for high value internal storage areas, so the assumption is that not many buildings will have facades exceeding SR4/5, in fact as SR4 requires reinforcement few facades could even exceed SR3.
  • LPS1175 assumes one attacker uses tools in group A-E and two attackers use tools in group F-H.
  • Tool groups A-E are normally for external facades (group B including a 3.6V drill, group C including a 12V drill, group D including 12V power tools, group E including 18V power tools), while groups F-H are normally for strongrooms (group F including 36V power tools, group G including 54V power tools), and H tools (like diamond cores, thermic lances, 5kW grinders, concrete chainsaws) being a precursor to professionals driving, shooting or blasting their way in. It would be unusual to spend enough to make the whole building resistant for many minutes to the biggest sledgehammers, pickaxes, crowbars, drills and saws, as by the time those tools work the response force should intervene, but in case they do not, perhaps because the a layer of detection failed, an inside room would be hardened against whatever are the expected threats such as hydraulics, enforcers, cutting torches, the most powerful battery tools and petrol tools. Consider that even group G 54V power tools are available from your local Toolstation: £470 for a reciprocating saw, £460 for a 5” grinder, £750 for a hammer drill, £870 for a cutoff saw, and group H tools are in the shops for a few hundred or thousands.
LPS1175 tool groups
  • LPS 1175 also covers ‘security enclosures’ which are ‘security containers’ if self contained.
  • Fixings to substrates should be by M6 for SR1, M8 for SR2, M10 for SR3, M12 for SR4-5, M16 for SR6-7 and M20 for SR8.
  • Glazing, infills and external fixings can all be attacked in LPS1175 testing.
  • SR rated products are still sold, but the latest version of LPS1175 changed to separate tool group and time scores, so, for example, lasting 1 minute against tool group A gives an A1 rating equivalent to SR1, B3 is the old SR2, C5 is the old SR3, D10 is the old SR4, E10 is the old SR5, F10 is the old SR6, G10 is the old SR7 and H20 is the old SR8.
  • The test is passed if someone (a 16”x9” ellipsis block) could not squeeze through a hole made in the product, or if the product is smaller than the usual 16×9 hole then a hole cannot be made 5” in diameter or big enough to pass what is protected if smaller than that.
  • LPS 1175 doors, excluding communal doors, include:
    • AccentHansen with their Secureshield using a honeycomb-filled 1.6mm steel skin ranging from SR2 to SR6,
    • Ascot with their honeycombed steel Centurion A36 range rated SR1 to SR5 (they imply they are CPNI but obviously the SR1-2 could not be). The SR3-5 are SBD rated, SR4-5 for terror.
    • Assa Abloy do doors from SR2 to 4. The (Adams Rite) Safeguard wooden range can be painted, veneered or panelled and can have vision panels so might be discreet enough to pass as a residential door. The SR3 rated Trenchard is steel reinforced 59mm laminated hardwood which can be glazed. Meanwhile their SR4 rated Ultimum is also steel reinforced wood at 67mm thick and can open inwards but at most in terms of glazing can only have a vision panel. These two appear to be based on the old hardwood/steel laminate AdamsRite Concept 2 & 3. Neither comes in a ballistic or blast version although they do sell timber-based ballistic and blast doors without manual attack security rating. The new CPNI versions in this timber range are the Cromwell (formerly Concept 2, 54mm, 4 x 16mm hinge bolts, single or multipoint rim lock, blast rated to EXV25, vision panel option), Fenwick (58mm, 4 x 16mm hinge bolts, rim multipoint, hardwood lamel & steel plate core, ballistic to BS5051 G1, blast rated to EXV20, said to be SR4, vision panel option) and Bowden (formerly Concept 3, 68mm, hardwood lamel & steel plate core, 4 x 16mm hinge bolts (can be reinforced into masonry) & multipoint, blast rated to EXV10, ballistic to FB4 & G2, vision panel option). There is still an old video on youtube of real British soldiers trying to sledgehammer, axe, pickaxe, enforcer and shoot their way past the old Safehaven door exit only version used for a panic room, which looks like it is based on a Concept 3 with sold hardwood, steel & resin core, morticed 3 point locking, upgraded to G2 / FB4 ballistic and EN1523 blast. Their doors from SR3 upwards and FB1 are SBD terror rated. The top of the range used to be customisable CPNI blast / ballistic / manual attack doors, the Wellington up to 1,500kPa-msec impulse with vision panel option and the Wiltshire ballistic door. Resold by Dennison Doors.
    • Bastion do doors up to SR4 for their BastionWall modular enclosures.
    • Bradbury do LPS1175 doors in their SBD M2M range, 45-66mm thick with 1.5 steel skin, to SR2 to SR4 which can come with vision panels, inward opening and wood effect finish. The SR4 is SBD terror rated. However, as with most high security doors, the lock is rim mounted and massive and the doors look industrial. These are resold by Theam (also resell Extendor grilles and Seceuroglide roller shutters). Lathams, Security Care (as Demon Doors) and Vaylia resell Bradbury doors.
    • Burton Safes do an SBD rated Kronos range from SR2 to 4 which can be inward opening but only industrial style. The SR4 is SBD terror rated. Incidentally, they do a domestic Janus range of RC3 & RC4 doors to EN1627 which could see off a battery drill, club hammer or axe for 10 minutes, but not a sledgehammer or power tools.
    • Charter Global do a 66mm thick 1.5mm steel skin Obexion door rated SR2 to SR4, which can have vision panels, although the SR2 is outwards only. The SR3-4 are SBD terror rated.
    • Crittal Fendor used to make Secureline SR2 doors (and SR2-4 windows) but did not reveal much online to reassure around domestic suitability. They made the windows for Broadmoor and Rampton, but withdrawn their LPS1175 certificate on 25/11/20.
    • Design & Supply do a rockwood core 1.5mm steel skinned 45mm thick Desray door rated SR1 to SR3 (Security Care resell the Desray 2 to SR2 and Bradbury doors rebranded as Demon).
    • Doortechnik do outward opening X15 and X20 doors 45-55mm thick 1.5mm steel skinned rated SR1 to SR3 with vision panels.
    • Fortress Protec do BBS doors rated SR1 to SR5, 50-58mm thick, but outward opening. The BBS4 and BBS5 are SBD terror rated. However they seem to have vanished from the internet, under all incarnations such as Fortaxa, SEFA and Security Doors, since their fire door was named in Grenfell Tower Inquiry.
    • Harlech do Crime-gard SR1-4 doors, which appear to be resold Bradbury M2Ms.
    • Hampton Conservatories say they do an SR2 wooden outward opening door (they do the only SR2 window).
    • Hodgson Sayers do maintenance and access doors, the Epsilon (1-3), Apeiron (2-4) and Colossus (2) (no longer marketed), rated SR1 to SR4.
    • Kingsley Composites do GRP doors SR2-SR4 for environments where steel would rust, but are really only aimed at substations etc.
    • Lincoln Security doors are 66mm thick with internal Dufaylite honeycomb and come in SR2-SR4 including inwards opening and glazing. There is the Victor 1.5mm skin, Vigilant (2mm skin) and Vanquish, while the Vulcan (3mm skin) has reinforcement and armour with CPNI rating aimed at critical infrastructure. They look like Bradbury M2Ms.
    • Metador do Defender Xtreme doors rated SR1 to SR3 with vision panels available but only outward opening.
    • Protect GRP claim to do an SR3 door but this is outwards only and appears to be for the tollbooth market.
    • PSF Wales do outward doors rated SR2 to SR4 in their Hercules range but aimed at the enclosure market, although they can into brick.
    • R&D Sheetmetal do doors in their Security Evo range rated from SR3 to SR6, with vision panel options with grilles on the SR3-4. They say they have a new SR3 & 4 certification on an inwards opening model, and appear not to market the SR5-6 versions.
    • Rhino Systems do doors rated SR2 to SR4 in their HF (fire) and WT (flood) ranges including inwards openers and vision panels, 66mm thick with 1.5mm steel skins and blast protection. They also have RhinoHCFD doors with CPNI Enhanced rating to deter blast, ballistic, manual attack and ram raid attacks, 40-60mm thick with vision panel option and similar RhinoHC doors with CPNI Base rating.
    • Robust UK (owned by Novoferm owned by Sanwa) do an outward only TuffDor range with steel skins, and timber core for the SR3-4, with wood finish option, various generous vision panels for the SR2 but only one small one for the SR3-4, and wood finish option, rated SR2-SR4, resold by Security Care. The Tuffdor 4 is SBD terror rated.
    • Shadbolt do a Shadsecure internal door (eg for flats) rated SR2 with a chipboard core and wooden finish.
    • Stafford Bridge Doors do 1.5mm steel skinned plywood ranges from SR2 to SR4 46-59mm thick with vision panel option, the Wilton (SR4, upgradeable to FB7, C15, FD60), Halton (SR4, 56mm thick, 1mm steel skin, upgradeable to FB7, C15, FD90), Sandhurst (SR3, upgradeable to FB1, C25, FD60) and Hendon (SR2, upgradeable to FB1, C25, FD60), including steel or wood finish, inward openers. They also do CPNI outward only versions of the Sandhurst, Wilton, Halton and Whitehall with no vision panel.
      • The Whitehall CPNI (see spec) is a 56mm thick laminate of steel and hardwood with four SurelockMcGill S2-HA7 hinges, five SurelockMcGill S8375 hinge bolts and rim mounted three to five way 3-way Slimline or Solent bolts and can come with Tecdur DC49GG (grid glass) vision panels. It is distinguished by an armoured escutcheon and set back handle in line with it.
      • Their Salsbury SR4 door was in a youtube video seeing off more powerful Holmatro rescue tools which tore the skin off but it stayed locked by a SurelockMcGill Stirling.
      • The 55mm thick Halton SR4 is plywood and 1.5mm steel with rim mounted SurelockMcGill Slimline two, three or five way lock, two Surelock McGill S8375 hinge bolts and can come with Tecdur DC49GG vision panel. The 58mm thick Halton CPNI has a rim mounted three way SurelockMcGill SL313 lock and three of their S8375 hinge bolts.
      • The Wilton CPNI (see spec) is 55mm thick and has a rim mounted SurelockMcGill three way SL325 lock and three of their S8375 hinge bolts.
      • The Sandhurst SR3 and Wilton SR4 were seen in a Youtube video defeating a police MOE team in training with an enforcer, halligan and hydraulics. The Sandhurst and Wilton can also be rated for blast and up to FB7 ballistic. The locks are surface mounted Surelock McGill Stirling single point.
      • The 54mm Sandhurst SR3 is steel and plywood with a SurelockMcGill Sterling single lock or Slimline 3 point lock, three SurelockMcGill S8375 hinge bolts and can come with Tecdur DC28 / DC35 vision panels. The 55mm Sandhurst CPNI (see spec) has a rim mounted three way SurelockMcGill SL315 lock and three of their S8375 hinge bolts.
      • The 46mm thick Hendon SR2 has a rim mounted SurelockMcGill Sterling single or Slimline three way or morticed Nemef 642/17 / 660232 lock, two SurelockMcGill S35G hinge bolts and can come with Tecdur 26 / DC48 vision panels.
    • Strongdor do the Securidor+ range SR1-4 (S1 45mm thick 1.5mm skin with Nemef triple lockset, S2 45mm with Assa deadlock, S3 51mm with Hooply Cefiro multipoint, S4 45mm, range similar to Robust’s Tuffdor) such as the S3, and LPS2081 B rating (PAS24 equivalent) on their Lumidor SRB inward openers with vision panels.
    • Sunray Doors do an outward only ExecDoor range from SR1 (A1) to SR2 (B3) and an SBD rated Excludor range rated SR3 to SR6 (SR4, SR5 & SR6 are SBD terror rated), with surprisingly all models only 45mm thick using only 1.5mm steel skin. All except the SR1 take vision panels. At SR6 it looks like a cell door with bars on the vision panel and a humungous escutcheon over the lock, weighing in at a total of 21 stone. The SR5 is CPNI rated. The SR2 can have a vision panel without bars.
    • Technocover do the SBD rated outward opening Sentinel range from SR2 to SR5 and UltraSecure range from SR3 to SR4. These are SBD terror rated from SR3 upwards and can have vision panels and be wood clad. The SR2-3 doors come in 2mm steel skin and SR4-5 in 3mm.
    • Teckentrup do a blast and fire resistant SBD rated Teckentrup 62 range from LPS2081 SRA (outward opening Secure A) to LPS 1175 SR3 and up to RC4 42-62mm thick with 1.5mm steel skin, plus now LPS 1175 D10 to replace SR4. The SR3 can be inward opening and all can be glazed. They also do FB4 bullet resistant and cell doors also to RC4. The SR3-4 and FB4 (even if the FB4 is only SRB or SR2 manual attack rated) are SBD terror rated.
    • Torterolo (via Kensington Security Doors & Windows in the UK) do SR2 and RC3 rated doors including inward opening, the fire rated Protection and the Comfort UK. They also do RC3 rated Sun-light, Gold, Chrome, Pininfarina (Dream, Shield and Wave (wood finish option)) and RC4 rated E-glide (pivot) and Gold Plus (wood finish option), and RC4 Nuova Elegance interior residential doors.
    • TS Designs do outward opening SBD rated B5 and C5 rated doors with vision panel option, the PS2 and PS3. Spec for both is 45kg/m2 45mm thick with foam core, 1.2 steel skin and Mico’s Abryll (SR6) or Elite (SR3) single point or INT multipoint (SR6 & 69kPA blast) locking.
    • Urban Front do an SR2 inward door, the E80S. Their entry level front doors start at over £6,000.
    • Warrior Doors do SR2 and SR4 doors including inwards opening, but these are aimed at jewellers, and their LPS 2081 doors are aimed at communal entrances, although they are known for the strength of their fully glazed doors – territory most manufacturers shy away from. Warrior3 and Warrior4 can come SBD terror rated.
Salsbury SR4
Sandhurst SR3 (bolts top & bottom + 1 on side, Government level 2 so probably equivalent to new CPNI Enhanced version) & Wilton SR4 (bolts top & bottom + 3 on side), both with SurelockMcGill Slimline Multipoint
  • Sadly, there are no residential LPS1175 doors for houses. Due to potential residential suitability, although without reference to cost, you might want to consider steel doors with wood effect/panel options such as Robust UK’s Tuffdor, Teckentrup 62, Technocover’s Sentinel / Ultrasecure, Assa Abloy’s Trenchard, Bradbury’s M2M or Stafford Bridge’s Sandhurst. The Sandhurst is the thinnest, most domestic looking and may well be the strongest judging by the youtube video suggesting it can exceed its rating if teamed up with a multipoint and will costs about £8,000, but it is hard to come by examples of ‘domesticated’ products to compare.
  • Prices start from around £1,100 for SR1, £1,600 for SR2, £3,000 for SR3 and £4,200 for SR4 for basic industrial ‘steel slabs’, and several thousands more for a wood finish and glazing, easily north of £4,000. Samson Doors, for example, say their Hormann ThermPro is rated SR1 and LPS 2081 costing at least £1,342 for the SBD version (which thus is equivalent to LPS1175 A3). The reality is you have to pay over £2,000 if you want a decent looking door to stop someone wielding tools for a few minutes.
EN1627
  • If you cannot afford an LPS 1175 door then you could consider EN1627. This will probably look more domestic but you have to be careful what EN1627 actually tests. It might be the realistic option if you are not sure about the door reveal in terms of how the brickwork would take the impact through the jamb or fixing bolts or how long it would take to smash out the bricks. Consider that there is a youtube video of police accidentally taking a one brick wide pillar with the door using an enforcer – can your wall take an SR3 battering?
  • Also consider that the UK voted against EN1627 as we would be forced to adopt it as a British Standard. SBD have issued an interpretive guide to EN1627, warning that EN1627 does not test lockpicking. EN1624 only requires cylinders to EN1303 with ratings ending 41 for RC1 to RC3 and ending 62 for RC4 to RC6, and locks to EN12209 to class 3 for RC 1 to RC2 and class 7 for RC4 to RC6. Nor does it cover some common attacks, or barging out glass for RC1-RC4 – yes that is right, testers are allowed to hammer the rest of the door but not the glass. Whilst up to RC3 stealth attack is assumed, RC4 is supposed to handle banging and crashing, but if you buy RC4 be careful what separate rating any glazing has. EN1627 assumes an intruder is larger when crawling through a hole than LPS1175, LPS2081 and PAS, while the LPS standards test for hand holes as well. It gets worse: RC1 does not require laminated glass, RC2 allows P4A safety glass, RC3 makes do with P5A safety glass – which only really needs to stop a crowbar for 5 minutes but is only tested with a metal ball and which LPCB say is not even SR2, RC4 fobs you off with P6B which would need to stop a hammer for 10 mins but is only tested against 30 axe blows and would not even stop a screwdriver, RC5 assumes P7B will stop an angle grinder but is only tested against 51 axe blows, and RC6 says P8B will see off a percussion drill but is only tested against 71 axe blows. Check ESG’s ‘just how tough is security glass’ video of these European standards like 30mm P8B going down with almost the first punch.
  • LPCB say for glazed products RC1 is equivalent to at most SRA, RC2 varies from SRA through SRB to SR1 but probably just SRA, RC3 is a slight improvement varying from SRA to SR1, RC4 varies from SRA to SR2 but usually SR1, then there is a big step up to RC5 which varies from SR1 to SR5 but usually SR2 to SR4, RC6 varies from SR2 to SR6 but usually SR3 to SR5. For unglazed products they say an RC2 has an even chance of being in SR1 territory, RC3 ranges from SRB to SR2 but usually SR1, RC4 ranges from SR1 to SR3 but usually SR2, RC5 ranges from SR2 to SR5 and usually SR3 or SR4, RC6 ranges from SR3 to SR6 but usually SR4 or SR5. To be fair, the few products that have dual rating tend to equate RC3 with SR2 and if you look at videos of RC4 doors like the Skydas Standard 3 RC4 they can take a hell of a pounding from a sledgehammer (more than the club hammer used in SR2), however, BRE claims that 90% of RC4 doors fail SR3 and only last about 4 minutes against a hammer and screwdriver, meaning you probably do need need a RC5 to equate to an SR3. The twist is that EN1627 RC4 requires a 8.5″ brick wall so implies it is equal to it and if you only have a cavity wall or lightweight blocks then there may be little point having a door stronger than RC3. You can see from the tool groups that RC4 is similar to SR3, and the standard even attacks for twice the time, so is not to be sniffed at, but the methodology has flaws including that it is hard to check UK accreditation, hardware is not tested in the product and testers are limited in how they are allowed to use tools.
  • LPCB published a comparison of LPS1175 and EN1627.
  • In short, go for RC4 with no glazing if you want an almost affordable residential looking entry level security door that might be as strong as your wall, but to replicate SR3 for high risk domestic risk or any kind of targeted attack you probably need RC5 unglazed or RC6 glazed – which are hard to come by if you want residential style, in fact the author has yet to find any sold in the UK. You can buy industrial RC5 doors from MetalQuartz, Fichet and Doruksafe, and industrial RC6 doors from Sommer and Salzer. The closest you will come to the strength of brick in a residential door is an RC4 from suppliers like Abbey, Hormann, Novoferm and Skydas, but unless your home is made of wood, breeze block or thin brick you may as well forget about EN1627 for now.
  • Suppliers include:
    • Abbey Protect do RC2-4 residential doors with 1-1.5mm steel skins.
    • Gunnebo do a MagTek RC4 door.
    • DorukSafe in Turkey claim to sell RC6 residential wood skinned doors.
    • Hormann do RC3-4 ThermoCarbon (from £4,876) and ThermoSafe Hybrid front doors achieving RC3 with glazing or RC4 without glazing (from 4,400 EUR). Their ThermPro is PAS & SBD.
    • Munitus is a manufacturer in Lithuania worth knowing about in case you can find a distributor in the UK, as they make residential security doors and windows (to RC4 & BR6), similar to Skydas, in fact they cite Shield Security Doors as their reseller the same as Skydas. They have the Gerlock Classic RC3 (upgradeable to ballistic FB4), Max RC4 (upgradeable to FB6), FE5 (upgraded version of Gerlock to SD-STD-01.01 FE5, upgradeable to FB4) and FE15 (upgraded version of Max to FE15, upgradeable to FB6, they say its time to failure was 56 mins). Top Security Doors claim to be a reseller in the UK, but their director Adomas Saltenas is named on a draft Shield Front Doors website, so apparently tied up with the Fort, Skydas and Shield web of litigation, raising the question are Munitas really Skydas or at least using the same blueprints?
    • Novoferm do RC2-4 internal and external doors available in wood effect. The external 64m 1/1.5mm steel skin Novoporta Premio ES1 and 40mm 1mm steel skin Novosecure ES6 Slimline (can be glazed) are RC2; the external 63mm 1.5mm steel skin ES63 and internal 51mm thick 1mm steel skin ES9 are SC3; the 51mm 1 mm steel skin internal & external ES11 is RC4.
    • Robust UK sell the Secur-Dor range: Secur-Dor 2 with STS202 BR2 & PAS (1.5mm skins, 1.6mm frame, 11.5m laminated vision panels on PAS24, 2 x CEN7 deadlocks on BR2), the Secur-Dor3 with BR3 (2mm skins and frame, multipoint) and the Secur-Dor4 with EN13124-2 EXR2 blast resistance and tested but they simultaneously say passed and not passed RC4 (3mm attack face + 1.5mm protected face, timber core, 3 x deadlocks). They claim the RC4 is stronger than the SR4 as it is tested for 30 mins, which is odd as EN1627 RC4 tool contact time is 10 mins.
    • Securehouse do RC3-4 doors.
    • Shield Security Doors do 75mm thick residential doors rated RC2 (Standard2), RC3 (Standard3) & RC4 (Premium Plus & Standard 3 RC4), and build panic rooms.
      • London gangster Dave Courtney says quote his name as a discount code as he as one of their ballistic front doors at his ‘Camelot Castle’. Potentially worryingly, though, his Georgia Umidax coated milled version has a letter box and viewer, and from the boltwork it appears to be low down in Shield’s product range. In theory a letterbox could be a dummy for aesthetic reasons, built into the plastic weather skin for heritage replica reasons, but another reseller says it may have restricted opening. One customer has even put a catflap in.
      • They are reselling Lithuanian doors from Skydas (there has been litigation between shareholders of both companies and Shield Luxury Doors and their UK manufacturer Fort Engineering over sharp practice) and their panic rooms are from Eurovaults.
      • The RC3 can be sledgehammered through the attack skin to outline the fins but the frame still holds off for the length of a test.
      • Shield are not to be confused with struck-off Shield EU run by director in common, cannabis oil salesman and ‘model agent’ James O’Connor who were reselling Fort Engineering (he is a director for them too) doors using Shield logo and name with what appears to be the same doors as Skydas (some of whose staff moved to Fort). Fort are now trading as Fort Security Doors offering ‘half price wholesale’ and tellingly for EN1627 proponents charge £450 extra to upgrade from RC3 to SR2 and now sell PAS24 and SR2 doors. With extras and VAT they come to easily £2,000 for a SR2.
      • What is perhaps more interesting is that Skydas do a 91mm thick Fortress ($12,000, modified Premium) which they say exceeds RC4 as it also has the American US-DoS standard SD-STD-01.01 15FE rating, and their 75mm thick RC3 Embassy ($9,000, modified Standard 3) likewise is designed to stand up to multiple attackers and is rated 5FE. Either door could be handy in a mob attack as the 15 minute rating is against a 6-man team (they have to be ‘muscular’ and over 11 stone) with a 12lb sledgehammer, 120lb ram, 5’ crowbar, wood splitter maul, 3.5lb axe, 4’ boltcutters, propane torch, cold chisel, punches and saws, albeit allowing up to a 12” hole. They can be fireproofed for $3,500. With up to 0.75” allowed for shims, a lot is riding on the frame not being peeled back to expose the fixing bolts but at that price point high net worth punters can afford a custom subframe. SD-STD-01.01, incidentally, includes shotgun and rifle and is the only publicly available standard testing softening up by gunfire before manual attack (CPNI standards are confidential and products not generally sold to the public).
      • Whilst one cannot recommend trusting businessmen who can’t trust each other with a database of UHNW addresses, if anyone still makes them they are worth considering buying anonymously.
    • Strongdor do a 1.2mm Zintec skinned rockwood core outward opening Securidor range rated RC1-3 (45mm thick, similar to Robust’s SecurDor).
Munitus RC3 door
Munitas double glazed RC3
Munitas RC3 P6B glazing
Munitas RC3 dynamic load
RC3 patio door
RC3 door
  • CPNI can give further ratings for penetration standards: ‘base’ (equivalent to SR3, holding off an amateur terrorist for 5 minutes), ‘enhanced’ or ‘high’ (what used to be called SEAP 1 / 2 / 3), and detection (of compromised asset inside) 1 to 4. CPNI is a more severe test, for example a product with SR4 might only last 1 minute against Base CPNI and 0.5 minutes against Enhanced CPNI.
RC4 door formerly sold by Shield
Gunnebo MagTek RC4
RC5 door
Salzer S4 RC6 (RC5 with safe lock)
STS202
  • WarringtonFire’s Security Technical Schedule 202 gives ratings from BR1 to BR6, similar to LPS1175 in terms of toolsets, but with shorter attack times at the top end with BR1 lasting 1 minute, BR2 3 minutes, BR3 5 minutes and BR4 upwards lasting 10 minutes. Products pass if they stop a cylindroid passing through 500mm long and 380x225mm across.
  • It would be unusual for a security door not to have SBD as well as any insurance standard, so a good starting point for finding suppliers of doors to STS is the SBD door database. SR2/BR2 is the standard requirement for communal doors so unfortunately most BR2 doors are for blocks of flats rather than for insurance requirements in commercial or industrial sectors.
  • Suppliers include:
    • Eurobond Doors do a BR2 steel door.
    • Lathams sell Chinese steel security doors including the 1mm skin BR1 Heavy Doorset (c. £440), 1mm skin BR2 Ultra Multipoint (c. £620) and 70mm thick 2mm skin BR3 High Security Doorset (SBD terror rated, c. £1,100). Some models are not advertised but available to order.
    • Neos Protect do a range of BR2 doors for communal entrances some of which might at a pinch suit a modern house made of concrete or metal.
    • Robust UK sell the Secur-Dor range with SBD: Secur-Dor 2 with STS202 BR2 & PAS (1.5mm skins, 1.6mm frame, 11.5m laminated vision panels on PAS24, 2 x CEN7 deadlocks on BR2), and Secur-Dor3 with BR3 (2mm skins and frame, multipoint).
  • Unfortunately only Lathams and Robust offer BR3 doors but with no wood finish option, meaning STS can safely be ignored for private homes.
BR2 door
LPS2081
  • LPCB have a lower domestic standard, LPS2081, like PAS24, against opportunistic burglars who are not prepared to make a noise or spend over 3 minutes or carry big tools. It requires locks to have 1,000 differs for SRA and 5,000 for SRB, and to use LPS1242 class 1 or BS3621 cylinders. But once SHTF, burglars may not worry about being seen with tools or caught red handed if there are no police or if they are desperate. LPCB say SRB is sometimes as strong as SR1 otherwise sits just below it, while SRA is always below SR1. LPS2081 has two toolsets: A and B. Toolset A has to be resisted for 1 minute and includes cable cutter, glass cutter, knife, spanner, 1’ crowbar, pliers, punch, rubber mallet, screwdriver, traction screws and wedges. Toolset B has to be resisted for 3 minutes and further includes boltcutter, claw hammer, drill bit, hand drill, junior hacksaw, tin snips, pipe wrench. The tools cannot hit each other as silence is assumed. Other than that, they are the tools from LPS 1175 groups A and B. LPCB LPS standards come with a health warning which is they are a monopoly scheme operated by testing house BRE Global Ltd which you cannot inspect and reputedly include rest times. In contrast the theoretically weaker standards PAS and lower EN1627 ratings are set by BSI.
  • LPS2081 doorsets are available from Bradbury, Strongdor (glazable inward or outward opening Lumidor), Teckentrup, Design & Supply, Premier SSL (inward or outward opening Jensen 81, SBD 81 & Industrial 81) and Warrior (11.5mm glazing, bare steel communal entrance fully glazed only). Most seem to be communal entrance fully glazed doors or sheet clad, and only Teckentrup and Premier SSL mention LPS2081 on their website. Even police should not accept LPS2081 for low risk blocks of flats as normally the minimum is SR1/BR1.
PAS24
  • Police say PAS24 is as good as SR1 or SR2, but LPS175 allows noisy attacks and breaking glass so it is not clear why they think so other than that disregarding noise and breaking glass it is similar to an LPS1175 A3, ie longer delay than an SR1 (if the burglar plays the rules of being silent). LPCB say for glazed products PAS24 is equivalent to RC2 and SRA or sometimes SRB, and for unglazed products they say it is worth RC3 and between SRB and SR2 but usually SR1. So-called security doors without LPS1175 or STS 202 or equivalent certification may well be strong, but at the end of the day are not rated to even stop a screwdriver for a minute. PAS24 assumes the burglar won’t break glass or pick the lock or rip the frame out, and only tests quietly wiggling hand tools for 3 minutes; it is merely one way of achieving the bog standard requirement in building regulations Approved Document Q. It even allows thumb turns so a burglar can break a door light and let himself in, although for door glazing it does require 6.8mm laminated glass near thumbturns. PAS24 2016 requires accessible doors and windows without locks to have 6.8mm laminated glass and locking windows to have 6.4mm laminated glass as a minimum; it also requires British Standard locks. Europe has their copycat standard called EN1627 but this does not include locks. PAS24 can be achieved with RC3 plus extra requirements, in other words RC3 is not even enough for a new build let alone a prepper. That is a reminder why EN1627 doors need RC5 to begin to call themselves a high security door. But nor is PAS24 anywhere near as strong as a brick wall either so it leaves you with a weak spot.
  • Examples of good PAS24 doors include Solidoor, or Rockdoor, which whilst not a security door is solid core and can come with mesh reinforcement which forces even firemen to take two minutes cutting out locks with a circular saw.
Pitiful: PAS24 testers tickle a door

US military

  • Manual attack specifications as per ‘walls’ post advise:
  • Level II low threat = hollow metal 1.6mm steel 4” centres hat-stiffened 1.6mm steel faced doors with 1.9mm steel channel with recessed edge, in double rabbet 4” jamb fully welded 1.9mm steel frame. Add more doors rather than upgrade one door for delay beyond 1 minute. Hinge bolts and two locks, one being a mortice deadbolt and the other a rim drop bolt with anti wedge and anti drill plates rated to 5.45t. Or construct from:
    • 1 minute for garage door from 1.2mm galvanised steel roller door,
    • 1 minute (also level IV) from 3/8” steel plate on 20 gauge (0.81mm) steel plate with two padlocks,
    • 1 minute from 16 gauge (1.34mm) metal rollup door,
    • 2 minutes from 16 gauge (1.34mm) hollow steel door,
    • 2 minutes (also level III &V non-explosive) from ¼” steel plate with padlock,
    • 2 minutes (also 4 mins at level V (sic) non-explosive) from ¾” steel plate on 3” rigid insulation on 1/8” steel plate,
    • 4 minutes (also 2 mins at level V non-explosive) from US class 5 vault door,
    • 5 minutes (also 1 min at levels III-V) from 16 gauge (1.34mm) hollow steel door with hinge bolts, astragal and drill resistant deadbolt,
    • 6 minutes from two layers of 10 gauge (3.12mm) hot rolled steel on ¾” plywood,
    • 6 minutes from 3/8” steel on 3” redwood on 0.036 steel,
    • 11 minutes from ¼” stainless steel on 0.5” polycarbonate on 10 gauge (3.12mm) mild steel,
    • 12 minutes from three layers of 10 gauge (3.12mm) hot rolled steel on two layers of ¾” plywood,
    • 14 minutes from sandwich of two layers of 9 gauge (3.5mm) hardened steel and one layer of ¾” plywood,
    • 15 minutes from 12 gauge (2.36mm) hollow metal door filled with lightweight concrete with hinge bolts, astragal and drill resistant deadbolt,
    • 20 minutes from sandwich of two layers of 9 gauge (3.5mm) hardened steel and one layer of ¾” plywood lined with two layers of 0.9lb per square foot gravel finish roof paper,
    • 20 minutes from sandwich of 3 layers of 10 gauge (3.12mm) hardened steel and 2 layers of 0.5” acrylic,
    • 20 minutes from sandwich of 3 layers of 10 gauge (3.12mm) mild steel and 2 layers of 0.5” polycarbonate,
    • 27 minutes from sandwich of 9 layers of ¾” plywood and 8 layers of 10 gauge (3.12mm) steel plate,
    • 30 minutes from 12 gauge (2.36mm) hollow metal door with hinge bolts, astragal, drill resistant deadbolt and 3 point locking.
  • Level III medium threat = prison door to HMMA 863-14 with 4 minute delay in concrete block wall; hollow metal 1.9mm steel 4” centres hat-stiffened 1.9mm steel faced doors with 2.7mm steel channel with recessed edge and 7 gauge (4.24mm) astragal, in 3,000PSI grouted double rabbet 8” jamb fully welded 2.7mm steel frame. Hinge bolts and two locks, one being mortice and one rim with anti wedge and anti drill plates rated to 5.45t. Or construct from:
    • 1 minute from 16 gauge (1.34mm) hollow metal door with hinge bolts, astragal and drill resistant deadbolt,
    • 4 minutes for garage door from 1.75” hollow metal door with 12 gauge (2.36mm) skins and stiffeners on 6” vertical spacing (ammunition dump door),
    • 5 minutes from 12 gauge (2.36mm) hollow metal door with hinge bolts, astragal and drill resistant deadbolt,
    • 10 minutes (also 4 mins at level V) from ¾” steel plate on ¼” steel plate,
    • 14 minutes (sic) (also 4 mins at level V) from 3/8” steel plate on ¼” steel plate,
    • 15 minutes from 10” thick 0.5” metal sheet skinned door, with internal locking,
    • 22 minutes from 3/8” drill resistant steel plate GSA class 6 vault door,
    • 26 minutes (also 17 mins at level V) from ¾” steel plate on 3” redwood on ¼” steel plate,
    • 30 minutes from 6” thick 0.5” metal plate door filled with lightweight concrete, with internal locking.
  • Level IV-V doors are vault doors or use multiple level III doors. Or construct from:
    • Level IV:
      • 5 minutes from 12 gauge (2.36mm) hollow metal door with hinge bolts, astragal, drill resistant deadbolt, filled with lightweight fireproofing,
      • 15 minutes from a 10” thick 0.5” plate skinned door, filled with lightweight concrete, with internal locking,
      • 30 minutes from a 10” thick 0.5” plate skinned door, filled with lightweight concrete reinforced with exmesh, with internal locking.
    • Level V:
      • 3 minutes from sandwich of 3/16” steel plate, 1” insulation and two layers of 22 gauge (0.66mm) sheet metal,
      • 5 minutes from 6” thick hollow metal door with 0.75” steel front plate and 0.25” back plate, filled with lightweight concrete reinforced with exmesh, with internal locking
      • 12 minutes from sandwich of 0.5” hardened steel, 1.25” oak, 0.5” plywood and two layers of 0.25” hardened steel,
      • 15 minutes from 10” thick hollow metal door with 0.5” skins, filled with lightweight concrete reinforced with exmesh, with internal locking,
      • 16 minutes from sandwich of two layers of ¼” hardened steel, two 3” layers of urethane foam, ¼” perforated steel plate and 1.5” oak,
      • 17 minutes from sandwich of two layers of 3/8” A36 (low carbon) steel, 2.125” polyurethane foam, 0/25” perforated steel and 2.5” oak,
      • 18 minutes from sandwich of two layers of A36 steel plate, 4” polyurethane foam and 3” oak,
      • 19 minutes from sandwich of two layers of 3/8”A36 steel, 3” oak and 4” silicate foam,
      • 23 minutes from sandwich of two layers of 3/8” A36 steel, 4” silicate foam and 3” oak,
      • 30 minutes from a 10” thick hollow metal door with 0.5” skins, filled with lightweight concrete reinforced with exmesh, with internal locking and welded C steel grating vestibule for standoff.

US military prison

  • USA brig doors are expected to be hollow metal and withstand 6t overall or 3t on an unbolted corner.
  • US hollow metal prison doors must pass the ANSI/NAAMM HMMA863-14 test for static load in the centre, a rack test for load on unlocked corners, an impact test against ramming for as long as a riot would last, and bullet resistance to UL752 level 3 handgun. There are four grades: grades 1-2 need 2.3mm skins while grades 3-4 only need 1.7mm skins. Door thickness to be 2”. Vertical stiffeners to be spot welded at 3” centres and spaced at 4” centres and 1mm thick. Airspace to be filled with fibreglass or rockwool slabs. Edges to be reinforced with 3.1mm thick channels. Reinforcing plates are required for hinges and strikes. Jamb anchors to be every 18” + 2 per length. Masonry straps to be 2”x10”. Hinges to be 5” from top and 10” from bottom plus equally spaced intermediate hinges. Keyways to be 46” up. Frames to be filled with mortar grout with 4” slump.

US security commercial hollow metal doors

  • US hollow metal security commercial doors must pass the ANSI/NAAMM HMMA863-14 test. There are six grades from 1 to 6, with 3-6 being potential anti terror level.
  • Testing is done to prison standards ASTM F1450 and ASTM F1592, embassy ballistic & manual attack standard SD-STD-01.01, ballistic standard UL752 levels 3/7/8 and British insurance manual attack standard LPS 1175.
  • Tests include static load at corners and at and between locks, soft (shoulder for classes 1-3 simulated by cushioning the ram with 2” thick 6” diameter 32kg/m3 rigid foam polystyrene) and hard (sledgehammer for classes 4-6 simulated by 36kg 4” square (2.5” diameter) ram delivering 271J) impact, jamb-to-jamb stiffness, beading removal, edge crush, forced entry and ballistic.
  • Ballistic testing is up to AP rifle.
  • Static load testing includes trying to push out glazing by hitting the fixed stop side so pushing against removable beading.
  • Frames are tested against spreading with a hydraulic ram.
  • Edge crush is tested with a hydraulic ram with 1.5” diameter.
  • Skins for grades 1-3 are 1.7mm and for grades 4-6 are 2.3mm, continuously welded.
  • Minimum door thickness is 1.75”.
  • Reinforcement and anchorage to be as for prison doors.
  • Grades 3 upwards use a mob of 6, with 2 personnel for grade 1 and 4 for grade 2.
  • Each grade uses a higher tool group from A to F with increasing attack times from 5 through 10/15/20/40 to 60.
  • Static loads at edges only needs to be about 3kN deflecting 30mm for grades 1-2, about 6kN deflecting 20mm for grade 3, about 12kN for grade 4 and 20kN for grades 5-6 with deflection up to 10mm for grades 4-6, suggesting vulnerability to hydraulic rabbit rams.
  • However, locks have to resist around double that load at about 6kN at grades 1-2, about 12kN at grade 3, about 20kN at trade 4, and about 29kN at grades 5-6, and at all grades deflection is limited to 10mm.
  • Impacts have to be resisted to two blows of 80/120/160J for grades 1-3 soft body and 200J for grade 4 and 271J for grades 5-6 hard body, with 30 blows to glazed points and mulled systems, 30/75/100 blows to hinges and 100/200/300 blows to locks.
  • Edge crush of 0.25” has to be resisted to about 6kN for grades 1-2, about 9kN for grade 3, over 15kN for grade 4, over 25kN for grade 5 and over 35kN for grade 6.
  • Jamb to jamb stiffness has to resist 6kN with less than 0.375” deflection at trade 1 or over 8kN at grade2, while grades 3-6 are allowed up to 0.5” deflection from 16kN at grade 3, over 22kN at grade 4, over 26kN at grade 5 and over 33kN at grade 6.
  • This standard uses longer attacks so exceeds the old LPS1175 SR1-6 and instead is closer to the new LPS 1175 A5/B10/C15/D20/E40/D60.
  • There is also the civilian standard ASTM3038-14 which is similar to SD-STD-01.01.

SD-STD-01.01

  • The USA state department (‘DoS’) have a standard for embassy doors called SD-STD-01.01 which is available with FE (forced entry) or FEBR (plus ballistic) rating for 5, 15 or 60 minutes. They are designed to stop a mob attack by young men with guns or makeshift rams and levers. Perhaps surprisingly, an FE5 is only equivalent to an SR3, and even FE60s tend to use morticed locks, although this makes sense as more severe tools are not tested against locks but instead the door must withstand a battering so has to be strong enough to protect the lock unlike a typical LPS1175 door which uses rim locks behind thinner metal.
  • SD-STD-01.01 doors must open when unlocked with under 12lbs of force, top ensure usability.
  • SD-STD-01.01 doors fail forced entry (‘FE’) rating if any mounting fails or a 12″ x 12″ x 8″ cuboid or 12″ x 12″ cylinder can be passed through. This would appear to unfairly mean it fails even if it is still locked solid by bolts both sides but a hinge has been chopped off. DoS can test components that failed or passed to see how long they last, and, for example, you sometimes see FE15 doors that actually lasted, say, 56 minutes on ‘test to failure’ so just missed out on a FE60 rating. The tool group includes a two man 4″ x 4″ 120lb ram, two 30″ 10/12lb sledgehammers, wedges and two 5′ crowbars, plus for ballistic versions a rifle and shotgun.
  • The issue with SD-STD-01.01 for householders is that it exceeds the strength of a brick wall without protecting against severe tools, so is mainly only suitable for reinforced masonry buildings where only brute force is expected. However, some FE5s & FE15s come with other accreditations like RC4, as in the case of the Skydas Fortress (which they say last 77 mins against RC4 tools), giving at least some protection against a wider toolset and thus more suited to maintain consistent protection across the facade of a reinforced masonry building. This might also come with options for wood finish or bullet resistant glazing where the product is doubling up for a more residential market given the EN1627 accreditation.
SD-STD-01.01 FEBR 5 & 15
Skydas Embassy SD-STD-01.01 5FE
Skydas SD-STD-01.01 5FE
Skydas Fortress SD-STD-01.01 15FE
Ross FEBR60

EN1143

  • If a security door to RC6 such as the Salzer S4HS is not enough, then your next level up is a strongroom door to EN1143 or LPS1183, such as the 300kg 117mm thick Salzer S4W1 or for the Bond villain touch perhas the DorukSafe Level XI CDEX (rated against diamond core drill and explosives). Vault doors typically weigh from 300kg for a class I to 2.8t for a class XII.

Ballistic

Standards

  • The ballistic standard for barriers such as doors is BS EN1522 and EN1523, ranging from FB1 for .22 rifles to FSG for 12 bore x 70 shotguns, and for glazing it is BS EN1063 with equivalent prefix BR ratings. The US equivalent is UL752 which goes up to level 10 for a .50 rifle, or there is NIJ 0108.01 going up to level IV for a 30-06 AP rifle. 
  • Ballistic products often also come with fire, blast and manual attack ratings.

Tips

  • Beware weaknesses at edges, joints, locks and hinges. This is why security doors mount hinges and locks on the surface so they are not gouging out strength from the leaf core.
  • Handguns and some rifles do not blow unarmoured mortice locks out, but shotguns and some rifles do.
  • In ballistic attacks you usually want to hide occupants and consume ammunition, so any glazing should be screened and barriers ideally strong enough to not just stop one bullet to pass a test, but to enthusiastically eat up the whole magazine.
  • You can buy glass which triggers into privacy mode on hearing gunshot.
  • For high threat levels the most practical door protection may be a medium threat door backed by a high threat lobby wall.
  • For FB5 or NIJ0108.01 upwards you might want to use high hardness steel so, for example, you stop a Nato rifle with only 6.5mm weighing only 52kg/m2. Otherwise normal steel weighs 23kg/m2 for FB4, 48kg/m2 for FB6 and 120kg/m2 for FB7.
  • To reduce weight you may have to pay double for kevlar instead of armoured steel.

Products

Doors
Fittings
  • You can buy ballistic & manual attack escutcheons such as from SurelockMcGill.
  • Ballistic glazing in doors is accredited to EN1063 up to BR7 for riles or SG2 for shotguns. If using laminated polycarbonate glass the weight for BR4-BR7 is from 52-170kg/m2 and thickness is 24-74mm, and 52/83kg/m2 and 24/38mm for SG1/2. If using laminated glass the thickness for BR2-BR7 NS (no spall) is 31-81mm and weight 73-196kg/m2.
  • A stronger alternative for ballistic applications is laminated polycarbonate which usually means Lexguard. Even this will dent and flex with the bullet to soak up energy as the interlayer tears in a circle, but usually eats it as the glue stops fractures going all the way through. You need 18mm Lexguard MP750 for a 9mm handgun, 26mm BBPOL25 for a .357 to UL752 level 2, 32mm MP1250 for a .44 or 9mm Uzi to UL752 level 3, weighing 23-38kg/m2.
Architectural Armour ballistic door viewers
Citytsafes Modul-X SD-STD.01.01 FEBR60 vault door (reinforced concrete)
SurelockMcGill locks holds a FEBR60 for an hour

Blast

Standards

  • The blast door standard is EN13123 EXR1 to EXR5 for 3 to 20kg TNT at 3 to 5 metres, with glazing to EN13541, or ISO 16933 for arena tested glass. For glazing there is also the US blast safety standard GSA-TS01:2003.
  • Blast ratings are for standoff bombs. You will not buy a door that can see off explosives attached to it such as an Alford Strip, Gatecrasher or the old police favourite the Breachers Boot.

Materials

  • Blast glazing as non spall laminated glass for ER1-ER4 is 18-33mm thick and weighs 40-83kg/m2. To stop fragmentation needs it upgrading to ballistic rating too.
  • For a blast door according to the Steel Door Institute you need to specify:
    • Blast pressure: The maximum pressure (psi) expected to be exerted on the assembly by the projected blast event.
    • Blast duration: The length of time (milliseconds) required for the blast pressure to decay to zero.
    • Blast impulse: The blast energy as described by the area under the pressure vs. time curve (measured in pressure-time units such as psi-msec).
    • Blast direction: The direction of the blast load relative to the door assembly.
    • Rebound: The percentage of the initial peak blast pressure that is reflected back to the blast resistant unit.

Products

  • Assa Abloy do a Powershield steel door range that includes their strongest non-manual attack blast doors like the Goliath and Causeway. Their Fenwick and Wellington timber security doors can also be upgraded for blast.
  • Blast & Ballistics do blast doors.
  • Bastion do a CPNI blast door as part of their BastionWall dismountable strongroom, also available in SR4.
  • Safetell do the 80mm thick Stalwart to EXV25 & FB3/4 and EXV28 & FB4.
  • Sommer do the 142mm thick OST2 blast door to RC6 and FB7 ballistic with glazing option, and the OST2 RC5 with blast and FB7 ballistic (needs 24cm brickwork).
  • You will struggle to find a residential blast door but some manufacturers of residential manual attack and/or ballistic doors can add blast rating, such as Assa Abloy’s Safehaven and Robust’s Securdor.

Accessories

Locks

Standards

  • Locks should be to BS3621 if locking inside or BS8621 if using a thumbturn and single locks should morticed a third of the way up plus a rim or mortice lock a third of the way down.
  • BS3621 requires cylinders to be to BS EN 1303 grade 5 key security and grade 2 attack security.
  • PASx621 standards simply apply BSx621 to multipoints.
  • BS1021 is for external doublelocking whereby you can disable the inside keyway so a burglar cannot use a key to escape through the door if they broke in elsewhere, found your keys and want to stroll out the door with their swag.
  • Locks can additionally be to BS EN 12209. EN12209 has security ratings called box 7 (grades 1-7) and 11 (grades 0-H) for bolt projection and side & end loads and key security. For projection, grade 1 has 10mm, grade 2 = 12mm, grade 3 = 14mm and grade 4 upwards = 20mm. For side load, grade 1 = 1kN, 2 = 3kN, 3 = 5kN, 4-5 = 7kN and 6-7 = 10kN. For end load, grade 1 = 1kN, 2 = 2kN, 3 = 4kN, 4-5 = 5kN and 6-7 = 6kN. Grade 5 upwards are drill resistant for 5 minutes before the bolt is forced. For key security in terms of detainers, grade A = 3, B-C = 5, D-E = 6, F-G = 7 and H= 8. For differs, grade A = 100, B =1,000, C = 10,000, D-E = 20,000, F = 6,000, G = 50,000 and H = 100,000. BSx621 equates to EN12209 security rating 7B.

Recommendations

  • Back doors can just have a mortice lock in the middle backed up by mortice bolts top and bottom at least 4” from the top and bottom edges.
  • Mortice bolts in the top or bottom of a wooden door should be 50-100mm from the edge. If on the leading edge they should be halfway between the lock and the top and bottom.
  • Slide bolts should be to the highest rating under BS EN 12051. EN12051 has a security rating called digit 7 with grades 1 to 5 for saw resistance, side & end load and projection. For example, grade 1 can be sawed, does not lock but resists 500N side load and projects 12mm, whereas. grade 5 resists sawing for 5 minutes, resists 5kN end load & 10kN side load and projects 17mm. Grades 1-3 are not saw resistant. Unfortunately you will struggle to find anyone selling a bolt claiming to be certified.
  • All external doors need hinge bolts. Wooden doors need them at a quarter of the door height from top and bottom but not within 150mm of hinges. External hinges should have non-removable pins and all hinges should be backed up with hinge bolts.
  • Locking bars if used should be hardened steel and 10mmx60mm.
  • Do not let cylinders protrude more than 3mm.

Market

  • Rim deadlatches cost from £15-290, with British Standard versions mostly starting at £60, from brands like Ingersoll, Chubb, Yale, Legge, Banham, Union, ERA.
  • Mortice deadlocks cost from £15-280, with 5 lever British Standard versions from £17, from brands like ERA, Union, Chubb, Banham, TSS, Alpro, Asec, Briton, Adams Rite, Cisa, Willenhall, Imperial. High security 5 detainer locks which are harder to pick and come with 74,000 key differs start at around £100 and 7 levers from £190. Microswitch deadlocks for alarm setting are available for around £115 or £125 for a detainer version. Deadlocks which trap the key until locked are available for £70 to help stop you accidentally leaving the front door unlocked.
  • Multipoints (and various door hardware) to SBD are available from firms including GU, ERA, DGS, Maco, Ingenious (see 1009 Duplex 5 hook), FUHR, Fullex, Kenricks, Winkhaus & Avantis (used in Solidors, see also their FMT bidirectional mushrooms for windows). Multipoints should use hookbolts in upvc doors as plastic frames have so much give.
  • Patios should have anti-lifts and three locks. Patio locks are typically either the CAL restrictor, the traditional tiny push bolt such as from Ingersoll or ERA, or the beefier multipurpose bolt such as from Yale for £33. There are also drop bars for around £53 that block sliding doors as long as the glass is not smashed.
  • French door slave leaves should be held with bolts projecting 20mm into the head and sill. French doors can have their handles locked together and there are locks specially to do this such as the SBD approved Patlock, although you still ought to protect the glazing and use the included anti tamper spindle.
  • Insurance rated rim locks for security doors are typically SurelockMcGill Stirling or Abryll if single point, or their Slimline if multipoint.
  • CPNI counter terror locks include Pickersgill-Kaye HS100 Series 3 L8709/L8710, SurelockMcGill SL313, Mico 942-3L INT AD, Mico Abryll AD3, Mico Elite Combi P7 & Mico Evo 3 AD3. All are rim mounted and only one is single point.
Slimline lock allows a SD-STD-01.01 door to last an hour against a mob
Multipoint survives 15 min mob attack on Krieger door
Stirling lock survives SR2 manual attack
Slimline Multipoint on Stafford Bridge Halton SR3
SR3 scissor gate hook lock
  • Mico have a video of the Abryll lock surviving an SR6 test with wedges, sledgehammers and a 5’ crowbar, and another showing it holding an Ascot SR5 double door even where the bottom bolt was left unlocked, and another where it holds a Bradbury SR4 door, and the USCH5 cylinder guard surviving an SR5 sledgehammering, disc grinding, chiselling and drilling, and the USCH4 holding an PSF Wales SR4 door, and the L2 cylinder guard surviving chiselling and hammering to SR2. Their videos are a way to see various common LPS security doors such as Benweld under attack. What appears to be a couple of their INT 2 points featured on the double doors in Sky’s series COBRA.
  • Do not be fooled by apparently competing brandnames. Assa Abloy includes Chubb, Pickersgill-Kaye, Yale, Union, MulTLock, Henderson, Fichet, Adams Rite & Nemef.
  • Big names to look for in the domestic door and window lock market with many SBD products include ERA, UAP and Yale.
  • Rim locks allow beefier bolts and are protected by the whole thickness of door and frame. Once you get to LPS1175 SR3 it becomes hard to pass testing with mortice locks. There are plenty of highly rated doors using prison-strength single point rim locks, even up to SR6 rating which is basically a safe, although multipoints are handy against hydraulics. Below are photos of rim locks to SR4 &FB7 for single point and SR6 / RC5 / FB7 / SD-STD.01.01 FEBR60 for multipoint.
Multipoint on Quinshield SR2
Single point on Bradbury SR4…
Multipoint on R&D Sheetmetal SR5
Single point on R&D Sheetmetal SR6
CTS Secure SR6

Limiters

  • Also consider a Sold Secure Silver:
    • Securibar Innovation’s Securecoil 2 tonne rated door limiter to stop intruders bursting in when you open the door. There is also a Sold Secure door limiter that locks to the door frame rather than the wall, the Loxout for £50.
    • Federal Lock Y6157 Euro cylinder escutcheon.
    • Howsarlock for £5 to lock internal doors from inside. Buy several and use them for travel and bugging out in case you need to lockdown a premises. An alternative for overhead door closers is the more versatile Handcop HC1265 for $13, which is a 960lb-rated cord restraint.

Cylinders:

  • Should be SS312 Diamond (eg Avocet, Brisant, ERA, Federal, MulTLock, M&C Condor, Schlosser Technik, UAP) (or Gold with SS301 Bronze security handle), STS217, or (TS07) THF DS07 3 star, or 1 star with a 2 star/BS EN1906 handle (such as UAP or Hoppe at £46) or escutcheon (such as UAP HSE), or the higher standard of LPS1242. The minimum for high security residential should be LPS1242 (exceeding the building lock standard BS EN 1303).
  • LPS1242
    • LPS1242 is based on EN1303 and so has key security grades 1-9 and attack security grades 0-5 for cylinders. However it adds the manual attack ratings from LPS 1175 so additionally uses the tool groups A-G.
    • Key grades 6-9 need patented keys and grades 5-9 need registered keys with issue only by manufacturer for grades 7-9. Key security requirements include ranges from 100-1,000,000 differs for 2-9 detainers, and 2.5-40 Nm torque resistance. The requirement for key differs is tool group A = 1,000 = BSx621, B = 5,000 = LPS1214, C/D = 30,000 = BS EN1303 class 4, E/F = 100,000 = BS EN1303 class 6 and BS EN1300 (safe lock standard) class B, and G/H = 1,000,000 = BS EN1300 class C. BS EN 1303 class 4 is thus the benchmark for high risk residential.
    • LPS1242 adds a pass or fail grade for manipulation and manual attack security grades 0-8. A manipulation grade of 1 is available against bumping.
    • For attack grades the cylinder must resist 5Nm torque after drill, chisel (driven by 6kg hammer), pliers and plug extraction (by traction screw) attacks, although attack grade 0 is exempt from those attacks. Attack security includes ranges for drilling for power and times from 3-10 minutes, chisel blows 30-50, chisel twists 20-50, plug extraction times 3-10 minutes and power 15-17kN, and torque resistance 20-50Nm.
    • Manual attack grade tools are categorised similarly to LPS 1175. Category A tools are for stealth attack, including traction screws and pliers, category B adds tools of an opportunist including hammer, hand drill and pipe wrench, category C adds tools of a planned attack including chisel and 7.2V drill, category D adds tools of an experienced burglar including 12V drill and lockpuller, category D+ adds tools such as an 18V drill, category E adds the tools of a professional burglar targeting a saferoom such as 750W drill, category F adds tools such as a 2000W drill and category G adds tools as a precursor to vehicle, blast or ballistic attack such as concrete demolition gear.
  • Beware that escutcheons cannot stop drilling and EN1303 cylinders are not snap or drill proof, so ideally use a cylinder guard with a spinning disc – for what it is worth, CPNI do not allow anything less. Instead we have DHF TS 007 which takes EN1303 but subjects it to the BS3621 vulnerability test, and an alternative from Warrington, STS 217, and Sold Secure SS312 Diamond. BSx621 attack grade 2 was pre-snapping so is useless without something like a security escutcheon. TS007 1 star requires the cylinder specification in BSx621 Annex A A5 & A6 and BS EN 1303 clause 7 with 16000C5D rating against drilling, torque and plus extraction. 2 star handles requires the PAS24 A3 parts 1&2 cylinder test and if subject to EN1906 must achieve a rating of 16 – – – 3 – -. 3 star cylinders have to meet those BSx621, BS EN 1303 and PAS24 cylinder tests for an attack time of 150 seconds.
  • Cylinders should be flush with the handle: if set back the handle they can be gouged, if protruding the cylinder can be snapped.
  • Beware cylinder guards that fit inside a upvc door like UAP’s Maximum Security Cylinder Guard A at £4, which potentially only stop a weak cylinder being snapped, leaving it open to picking, bumping and drilling – you might as well replace the cylinder with a 3 star instead of only curing one vulnerability and having to route a 24x60mm hole in your door for the privilege. You can buy a 1 star cylinder, which you pick up for £11, like the UAP Plus Zero Lift that is TS007 rated against bumping, picking and drilling.
  • Brands with SBD rated products include Schlosser, MultTLock, Sancta, Federal, EVVA, Dormakaba (Gege, ExpertPlus with security grade 6 key level D), Carlisle Brass, Ingenious, Brisant, Kenricks, Asec, Yale, ERA, Assa, Ingersoll, Union, Cisa, Avocet, Iseo, EVVA & UAP. Prices range from £10-290 with those over £80 tending to be for Banham specialist locks.
  • Remember that some types of cylinder guard can be removed if a hole is made in the door, eg Avantis TwinFix can be taken out with a 4mm Allen key.
  • Fire brigade advice is in ‘Note 11’ which basically recommends internal keyless unlocking for doors and windows, and cautions against armoured security doors that can’t have a handhole cut through quickly to release the thumbturn. Most non-CPNI security doors would allow this.

Cylinder guards

  • LPS1175 doors need matching approved locks and cylinders need LPS1175 cylinder guards.
SR2 cylinder guard
SR4 cylinder guard
SR5 cylinder guard

Fittings

Frames

  • Steel frames in masonry can be grouted but only with 4″ slump mortar grout in braced frames. They should be continuously welded rather than spot welded or knockdown. Ideally they cover the gap between frame and wall to resist access to fixings.

Hardware

  • Avoid panic hardware, and even handles and thumbturns, go for key operation, and even then you might want to protect the internal end of the cylinder in case a hole is made in the door to allow manipulation. The door must be tough enough to stop any hole whatsoever. There are tools to turn handles through tiny holes.
  • Use only bolt-through door furniture secured from inside.
  • Fit astragals to protect the locking edge and a Z-strip to protect the hinge edge, such as from Zeroplus. An alternative to the Z strip is to weld a steel angle to a steel angle welded to the steel door plate or to the frame that would bump up against a jamb or U-angle in the door edge if hinges were removed and the door pulled.
Thumbturns can be opened from outside
Handles can be turned through a letterbox
Panic bars can be opened through the edge of the door

Reinforcement

  • Wooden doors can be reinforced with Kickstop screw-on anti-thrust plates (£32) and stronger bolt-through guards (£45) for outward openers, Birmingham or London bars or shorter hinge guards (£36) and frame guards (£37-42), frame plates (£37), staple guards (£42) and deadlock guards (£37).
  • Companies like Birmingham Bar sell screw-on bars (£19 each) and grilles (£150) to give at least a fig leaf of security for weak panels.
  • Inward opening doors can be reinforced against opening with bolts known by names such as ‘lockdown’, ‘barricade’ or ‘Nightlock’ or door stoppers on the bottom rail to bolt into the floor, popular in the USA. Solon Security DJ3 Door Jammer is SBD rated and Nightlock Orignal and Nightlock Lockdown 2 are recommended by CPNI. However, some brands of telescopic jammer can snap. Abus do an inward opening door bar for about £150.
  • Other gadgets include the sheriff-invented Barracuda sliding wedge jamb to slot under an internal door to lock it from the inward opening side. There are versions to lock door closers and outward opening door bars that clamps the handle. ERA do a similar but bigger barricade weighing in at 4kg, the Lockdown at £330 aimed at the school market. The Secure-Ring is chain for composite and upvc doors costing £28 which loops the handle to the wall.
  • The front door should have a limiter to DHF TS 003 and video intercom – voice identity is not enough. A cheaper alternative to video intercom is a door viewer to DHF TS 002 such as the UAP CVPL, although it is not entirely safe as there are locksmith tools to remove viewers to put a wire through to undo handles and TS002 only tests functionality, not attack resistance. TS003 for chains and limiters requires 200 x 100N impacts for wear and tear then 3 attack impacts to PAS24 (30kg sandbag and 50kg ram swung from 80cm above impact site). Beware that limiters can be defeated with mica cards or Lock Jockey.
  • Chains are useless.

Hinges

  • Security hinges should be to BS EN 1935:2002. Security hinges, hinge bolts and hinge guards are available such as from SFS, ERA and Kenricks.

Glazing

  • Security glazings’s gold standard must be polycarbonate glass as polycarbonate is great against blast and impact whereas glass is better against cutting and bullets as long as it is held together with interlayers and spall liner.
  • Glazing units in aluminium or upvc can be refitted with security tape or clips to foil a de-beading attack. Conservatories probably have to be written off and the door from them to the house treated as the external door, especially if the glazing is thin polycarbonate.
  • It is possible to buy vision panels for doors rated for 15 mins against a mob.
  • Manual attack glazing is accredited separately to LPS1270, or LPS1175 as part of the overall door, with the same ratings SR1-8 in terms of tool groups but with the addition of number codes for minutes delay against particular size holes.
  • Rated products include polycarbonate (‘Lexan’), laminated polycarbonate (Lexguard ‘detention’, 10-32mm of 2-4 ply, weighing 11-38kg/m2), laminated glass and laminated polycarbonate glass (sandwich of glass and polycarbonate).
  • For the American market:
    • For manual attack:
      • the 2 ply 10mm MPC375 is rated to survive:
        • 20 mins (50 blunt impacts and 50 sharp impacts) of prison riot to ASTM 1915 grade 3,
        • 11 mins of attack plus propane torch, chisel, sledgehammer and petrol to ASTM F1233 class III,
        • sledgehammer & wedges, chisel & hammer, wood maul, extinguisher , acetylene torch and petrol to HP White level II-TP-0500.02, and
        • 30 mins (20 mins of 2lb hammer plus 10 mins of 10lb sledgehammer) of hammering to WMFL level III;
      • the 3 ply 13mm MPC500 does not help further against cutting or melting but doubles impact delay to 40 mins against a prison riot with 100 blunt and 100 sharp impacts to ASTM 1915 grade 2 and to 60 mins of hammering to WMFL level II (twice as strong as the same thickness of single ply Lexan);
      • the 3 ply 18mm RC750 upgrades you to last 60 mins against a prison riot with extra acetone, axe, sledgehammer and chisel & hammers blows to ASTM 1233 class 4 and with 60 mins of 300 blunt and 300 sharp impacts to ASTM 1915 grade 1 and with extra attacks and windscreen wash to HP White level II-TP-0500.0;
      • the 4 ply 25mm MP1000 upgrades you to resist longer attacks to ASTM 1233 class V and extra attacks and fire axe and acetone to HP White level IV-TP-0500.0,
      • the 4 ply 32mm SP1250 upgrades you to resist longer attacks to HP White Level V-TP-0500.02 and WMFL Level I (which is level II for 60 mins hammering + ballistic for .44 magnum 240 grain.
      • This suggests that if you are not expecting fancy tools like a drill and recip but just a mob attack then 10mm laminated poly is enough to give continuous strength compared to a brick wall.
  • Lexguard MP1000 (26mm) is not only UL752 level 2 ballistic but rated ASTM F1233 Class V & HP White Level IV- TP-0500.02 for manual attack and can see off several minutes of sledgehammer and axe, while MP1250 (32mm) is not only UL752 level 3 ballistic but rated ASTM F1233 Class V, ASTM 1915 Grade 1 (60 min prison riot) & HP White Level V- TP-0500.02 WMFL Level I for manual attack so stopping 300 sledgehammer blows and 300 axe blows is deemed to last an hour.
SD-STD-01.01 15 min vision panel

Letterboxes

  • Letterboxes should be on the wall and to SBD and DHF TS 009, eg the DAD009, and ideally 10m from the building, but if you must keep a letterplate it should be to DHF TS008 (eg UAP Sotarian for £23 which only opens 37 degrees to stop fishing, or Yale Postmaster also with restricted opening) and BS EN 13724, or be no more than 40mm wide and unremoveable from outside. If you use a thumbturn the letterplate should be at least 40cm from it and have a deflector.
  • Any letterplate taken out of service should be protected with Safety Letterbox’s 1.5mm steel Flaplock LF05. There are blanking plates and locking flaps available, but they mostly only screw on or lock from one edge, so are rarely strong enough.
  • Visor guards or cowels disrupt hand access but are only a flimsy deterrent, unless rated such as ERA Fab&Fix NuMail or Royd & Tucker LP08 cowls to SBD, PAS24 & TS008 for £50.
  • Arson through letterplates could be stopped by an extinguisher bag like the SBD rated Prestige Products’ Homeguard Plus for £77, or there is the SBD rated DeRaat’s Letterblox blanking kit (resold by Safelincs) at £108 – which at 3kg is probably quite sturdy.
  • SBD rated wall mounted letterboxes are available from Post Boxes UK. TS 009 letterboxes are tested for 1 minute attack by tools like screwdrivers and pliers to open it or fish out mail and must resist pulling off with 1.5kN, and keylocks should have key security grade 3 to EN1303.
  • TS 008 letterplates are rated with digit 3 for resistance to thumbturn manipulation with tools like screwdrivers and pliers (1) and fishing of keys from hall table without pliers (2) for 3 minutes, digit 4 for lockability and digit 8 for arson protection against 15g firework, newspaper or 500ml petrol. Letterplates must resist fishing for 1 minute without tools.
DAD009 SBD letterbox
Yale Postmaster
ERA Fab & fix Numail
Royd & Tucker LP08 SBD letterplate
Mailguard Plus
Deraat Letterblox

Door entry systems

  • PIN & card entry is usually a no-no for high security applications without guards and physical security in another layer in front of or behind it. Firstly, they usually rely on low security electronic locks and secondly, decent ones need encryption, anti-tamper, heartbeat and to be beefed up with biometrics, so are expensive. But in combination with guarded physical security it can be great as it adds something you know with something you have. That can be combined with something you are like your fingerprint, voice, signature, veins or eye, or allegedly at MI5, your weight (probably actually just anti-tailgating). Some security doors can optionally have a second lock so you can keep one for key only with the main one also on a key but with a relay for PIN, fob, fingerprint and/or remote release button.
  • Video entry is safer than leaving a weak spot just so you can ID visitors through the door, as there are tools to unscrew peepholes and turn handles through the hole. Unfortunately the market is aimed at blocks of flats so suppliers are not big on explaining how their system could work for a house.
  • SBD rated domestic door entry systems typically cost about £600 just for the intercom before you even integrate it into a remote relay, £250 for a monitor, £150 for a power supply, £360 for a keypad with its own power supply, and you can pay £400 for a vandal resistant mullion proximity reader to read a fob.
  • SBD accredited door entry suppliers are:
  • SBD accredited domestic video intercom suppliers are:
    • Ring (Video Doorbell 2, Floodlight Cam (mains), Stickup Cam & Spotlight Cam (battery or solar) are SBD),
    • Videx (4000 Series suit a house but not SBD rated),
    • Comelit (VIP or Visto (£230) suit a house but not SBD rated).
  • The only SBD accredited video intercom is Ring. They charge £25pa for storing each camera’s video or £80pa for unlimited cameras.

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